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Abstract. This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into
a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is
equivalent to introduction of a passive player into a game (a player with a singleton set of pure strategies),
whose payoff depends on the actions of the active players, and it is justified by the law of conservation of utility
in a game. In a transformed game, each participant plays against all other players, including the passive player.
The advantage of this approach is that the transformed game is zero-sum and has an equilibrium solution. The
optimal strategy and the value of the new game, however, can be different from strategies that are rational in
the original game. We demonstrate the principle using the Prisoner’s Dilemma example.
Let X and Y be a dual pair of ordered linear spaces with respect to bilinear form 〈·, ·〉 : X × Y → R. If x ∈ X
is a utility function x : Ω → R, and p ∈ Y , is a probability measure p : Ω → [0, 1], then the expected utility is:
Ep{x} = 〈x, p〉
Consider a game such that the space of outcomes of the game is Ω := Ω1 × · · · × Ωm, where Ωi is the set of pure
strategies of ith player, and xi : Ω → R are the utility functions of the players. In this case, the game is zero-sum
if and only if
x1 + · · ·+ xm = 0
If p1, . . . , pm ∈ Y are mixed strategies, then
sup
p1
inf
p2,...,pm
Ep1×···×pm{x1} ≤ inf
p2,...,pm
sup
p1
Ep1×···×p2{x1}
The famous Min-Max theorem [1] states that in zero-sum games, there always exists a mixed strategy p¯1×· · ·× p¯m,
called a solution, such that the above holds with equality, and the common value is called the value of the game.
One of the problems in game theory is the existence of a solution to a non-zero sum game. Let us consider a
game, such that
x1 + · · ·+ xm 6= 0
If the utility functions add up to a constant function, so that
∑
xi ∈ R1 := {β1 ∈ X : β ∈ R}, then one can add a
constant function x0 := −
1
m
∑
xi to each xi so that the new utilities x˜i = xi + x0 are zero-sum. We argue that the
same can be done in the case when x0 is not a constant function. Thus, we define a bijection T : X → X˜ by
T (x) := x+ x0 = x−
1
m
m∑
i=1
xi
It is easy to see that the new utility functions are zero sum:
x˜1 + · · ·+ x˜m =
m∑
i=1
(xi + x0) =
m∑
i=1
xi +mx0 =
m∑
i=1
xi −
m∑
i=1
xi = 0
Notice also that the new utility functions are proportional to the differences between the original utility functions
and the sum of utilities of other players
x˜i = T (xi) = xi −
1
m
∑
xi =
1
m

(m− 1)xi −∑
j 6=i
xj


In zero-sum games, x˜i = xi (i.e. T (x) = x), because x0 = 0, or equivalently the utility functions differ by some
constant function xi − xi ∈ R1. Our transformation applies also to the case when these differences are not constant
functions.
The interpretation of adding utility x0 to xi is as follows. We can extend Ω =
∏m
i=1Ωi to Ω˜ := Ω0 × Ω, where
Ω0 := {0} is a singleton set so that Ω˜ = Ω0 ×Ω = Ω (because a singleton set plays the role of a unit with respect
to multiplication of sets). The singleton set Ω0 = {0} represents a player with only one pure strategy, and we refer
to it as a passive player. In another interpretation, Ω0 may represent a player, whose pure strategy has already
been chosen. The payoff mx0 : Ω → R to this player, however, may be non-constant, and depend on strategies of
the other active players (whose pure strategies have not yet been chosen). We argue that without including Ω0 and
x0 into the representation, the total utility of active players x1 + · · ·+ xm = −mx0 is not constant, and therefore
such a representation contradicts the conservation law of utility in a game:
x1 + · · ·+ xm ∈ R1
We argue that games, in which the above law is broken, such as the non-zero sum games, have incomplete repre-
sentation whereby some passive player (or players) has not been taken into account. The complete representation
is achieved by transformation T (X) = X + x0, and the transformed game is zero sum. A solution to such a game
always exists, and its value is
Ep¯1×···×p¯m{x˜i} = Ep¯1×···×p¯m{xi + x0}
If Ep¯1×···×p¯m{x0} = 0 (e.g. if x0 = 0), then this value equals the value of the original game.
Example 1 (Prisonner’s Dilemma). Let us consider the classical example of two-person game, when Ω = Ω1 ×Ω2,
and each player (the prisoner) has two pure strategies Ωi = {0, 1} — cooperate (ω = 0) or defect (ω = 1). The
payoff to each player is given by the utility function xi : Ω → R, which can be written in a 2× 2-matrix form
x1 = (x1ij) =
(
−.6 −10
0 −5
)
, x2 = x
†
1
The classical ‘rational’ solution to this game is for each player to use strategy ω = 0 (cooperate), so that pi(0) = 1,
and the value of the game is
E0×0{xi} = −.6
However, when human participants play this game, they usually cooperate or defect with almost equal probability
so that the observed strategies are dramatically different from pi(0) = 1. Note that for pi(0) = .5, the expected
payoff to each player becomes significantly lower
E.5×.5{xi} = −3.9
This ‘irrational’ behaviour presents a paradox that defied many attempts to explain it.
Observe that the game described is not zero-sum, because
(x1ij) + (x2ij) =
(
−1.2 −10
−10 −10
)
⇒ x1 + x2 /∈ R1
so that in fact the utilities x1 and x2 do not differ by any constant function. Let us now introduce the passive player
Ω0 = {0} (the detective), whose payoff is 2x0 = −(x1 + x2), and so x0 is
x0 = (x0ij) = −
1
2
[
(x1ij) + (x2ij)
]
=
(
.6 5
5 5
)
Thus, the payoff to the detective depends on the strategies of the prisoners, and it is maximised if at least one of
the prisoners defects. The utilities of the prisoners are transformed T (x) = x+ x0 to
x˜1 = (x˜1ij) =
(
0 −5
5 0
)
, x˜2 = −x˜1
In this representation, the game becomes zero-sum, and it has solution p¯i(0) = .5 and the value E.5×.5{x˜i} =
E.5×.5{xi + x0} = −3.9 + 3.9 = 0. This expected payoff to each player is lower than that of the strategy pi(0) = 1,
but it is independent of the decision of the other player to defect.
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